Abstract: This paper presents an application of the FMEA (Failure mode and effects analysis) to evaluate the operational risk in railway transport. The methodology developed by the Department of Rail Transport (KTS), including approval thresholds
Introduction
Upon requirements of the "Safety Directive" No 49/2004 [1] [2] , there has been elaborated the innovative Safety Management System-SMS. Model dedicated for railway undertakings and infrastructure managers, which has been implemented after obtaining approval from the Polish National Safety Authority(UTK). The SMS has been implemented in over 30 entities (which takes about 90% of the Polish market). The Model of Maintenance Management System(MMS) for Entities in Charge of Maintenance(ECM) has been prepared by the Railway Engineering Department(KTS) after publication of the EC Directive No 110/2008 [3] [4] . Theese aforementioned models are already implemented in RU's, MW's and others ECM's in Poland. The proposed innovation in those systems lies in proactive approach towards the safety management based on rare tools in railway transport for risk assessment and supervision over the technical measures. The FMEA method was used in order to perform the operational risk assessment (nowadays it is applied allover the country). Next step was implementation of RAMS method for monitoring the following parameters: reliability, availability, maintainability and safety of the rail-vehicles.
Operational risk assessment with use of the FMEA method
There have been worked out two supporting tools for the proactive approach towards safety notion. In order to meet the needs of the Safety Management System (SMS) to make the operational risk assessment, there was applied the FMEA method (i.e. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) in the innovative way and on a scale of Poland. It is based on the assessment of previously identified threats thanks to the special form of risk register (see Table No 1) by all the employees within the structures of certain railway undertaking. Subsequently, the conformity assessment body in accordance with the European Commission Regulation (EC) No 352/2009 [5] is in charge of both assessment and evaluation of the particular types of risks. There are applied 3 parameters for carrying out the risk assessment: Oc -as probability of appearance, Dt -as detection of hazard, Sr -as Result of the hazard. Moreover, there were also created common innovative, codified tables for process of risk evaluation, which are applied in Poland (tables from 2 to 4). Values of probability, easiness of detection as well as results of the risk is assigned in scale of between 1 and 10 and its product constitutes level of the risk for certain type of threat.
Values deriving from the above mentioned tables, should be assigned to the particular threats and the risk level for the particular type of danger should be calculated R pn =Oc · Dt · Sr 
Table No 3 Probability of threat detection
Probability of threat detection: (Dt) Scoring: Probability of detection of threat is very high. Revealing the cause of mistake is certain. 1 2 Probability of detection of threat is high. Means of control, which has been applied here could possibly allow to reveal the true cause of an error occurrence. Symptoms of the cause of an error occurrence are noticeable.
4
Here, exists an average likelihood of the detection of threat. Means of control, which have been here applied, could provide an opportunity to reveal the cause of an error. Moreover, symptoms indicating the possibility of threat occurrence can be set up as well as defined.
6
Low likelihood of danger revealing. It is very likely, that the means of control, that have been implemented here won't let to disclose the reason of an error occurrence. Determination of cause(s) of an error is very difficult.
8
Likelihood threat detection is insignificant. Practically it is impossible to determine the cause(s) of an error occurrence. 9 10 In the process of creating of the estimated value of probability of threat detection, it should be taken into account the best means/method of control currently in use. Appearing of danger can be really small and lead to diminish the level of safety insignificantly (for example disturbances during traffic operation ) or / and costs : in relation "2" to 10 000 Euro and in relation "3" to 50 000 Euro 2 3
Results of threat can be quite important and lead to reduction of the safety level ( for instance : an incident, people got hurt etc ) or / and costs : in relation "4" to 100 000 Euro , in relation "5" to 250 000 Euro , in relation "6" to 500 000 Euro
The danger appearance can be important and lead to significant level of security lowering ( railway accident and seriously hurt people etc ) or/ and costs: in relation " 7" to 750 000 Euro, in relation "8" to 1 000 000 Euro 7 8
Results of danger appearance can be very serious and lead to drastic fall of the safety level ( for example serious railway accident , fatalities etc ) or / and costs in position " 9" to 2 000 000 Euro , in position " 10" to 2 000 000 Euro) 9 10
Subsequently, we deal with individual risk levels assessment. We use for this the risk matrix (see table No 5) . Proposed thresholds of tolerance for risk have been accepted by the railway undertakings in Poland. It allows for risk management in the specified areas, facilitates also in a substantial manner the way of risk communicating, particularly as far as the engaged parties are concerned (for ex.: other railway carriers, infrastructure managers or suppliers for instance).
Inspection of the technical measures with use of the PN-EN 50126 of the RAMS method
During working out of the Model of Maintenance Management System (MMS), the FMEA method was used for operational risk assessment. Legal requirements have expanded the inspection of the technical measures related demands. For that purpose, the approach in compliance with PN-EN 50126 [6] standard has been implemented. Next, we have concentrated on monitoring the following parameters, namely: operational reliability of the rail-vehicles, their accessibility, susceptibility to maintenance and the safety of the rail-vehicles. The wide range of indicators has been elaborated for that purpose, which one should specify for the individual railway vehicles types (see table No 6 ). System threats concern : Braking systems, wheel sets, draw gear devices, control valves for freight wagons as well as tanks destined for transport of dangerous goods. There were also worked out the patterns (see 
Table No 6 -RAMS indicators (examples) RAMS Indicators Indicator

Required data Calculation method
R -reliability
FPMK
Implementation of RAMS
There is many outcomes of using the RAMS analysis, one of them is the RAMS report shown in table 8. The other one is the comparisons of different parameters between types of operated wagons. For example MTBF -figure 1 [days]
Fig.1. MTBF for selected wagon types
Value of MTBF for wagon types
The method of data gathering allows these parameters to be divied between years for every vehicle and type of vehicle.
Fig.2. MTBF in sequent years
Specific types of failures can also be analysed with the use of a failure dictionary according to a specific company standard.
Fig.3. Percentage of failure
These failures can also be analysed according to their appearance throughout sequent years. 
. Amount of failure types per wagon in years
And the last type of RAMS analysis outcome is the value of a specific parameter per a specific vehicle number. Without this it would be very difficult to adres any corrective and preventive measures to the technical assets in operation. Locking mechanism
In figures 1-4 only sample parameters where shown, it was supposed to present a general idea of data collection, analysis and representation of the outcomes. When having the full picture of all RAMS parameters it is possible to manage the whole fleet of vehicles.
Summary
These methods can expand knowledge and awareness of the safety status of those involved in safety management in individual companies. This happens through the use of a single risk assessment tool that can better identify and assess common hazards between the players and prevent or reduce the effects of rail events that occur as a result of them could take place. Another aspect of improving safety is analysis of historical data of rolling stock operation. On this basis, you can at least improve the process of operation of the vehicle as well as improving new constructions after the development of appropriate solutions from with manufacturers. Currently, the largest development if process of risk management is expected in the area of common risk. At the moment, in Poland, most of the entities identify threats in this area alone. The presented methods are currently being analysed by the Office of Rail Transport, State Commission for Investigation of Railway Accidents and the Department of Rail Transport. In addition, they are constantly improved by the railway operators in accordance with the philosophy of management systems of safety and maintenance.
